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The Eurosystem’s liquidity management policy was designed in such a way that money mar-
kets play a central role in distributing and reallocating the reserves injected by the central bank. 
Not surprisingly, therefore, the negative effects of the fi nancial crisis, which commenced in 
August 2007, on the functioning of these markets led the monetary authority to modify its li-
quidity management policy, exploiting the opportunities provided by an operational framework 
designed to have a notable degree of fl exibility. Given the origin of these changes, the need for 
them is naturally being reconsidered as normality returns to the money and fi nancial markets. 
However, the experience gained in the meantime in the functioning of these modifi cations may 
be useful both for the design of the time-sequence of their withdrawal and for preparing re-
sponses in the event that some of the changes that have taken place as a consequence of the 
crisis prove to be more permanent in nature.
In particular, the process of recovery of market confi dence in the solvency of credit institutions is 
proving complicated, although the recent publication of the results of stress tests has had a nota-
ble accelerator effect. The normalisation of the money markets is thus taking place rather gradu-
ally. Moreover, it is unlikely that the assessment of risk, in general, and of liquidity risk in particular, 
that the banks eventually make at the end of the crisis will be at pre-crisis levels. Both considera-
tions make it reasonable to assume that the Eurosystem will continue over the coming months – 
and perhaps a longer period – to face a higher demand for reserves than before the crisis.
The ongoing provision of large volumes of reserves poses challenges not only in the area of 
the management of this liquidity (e.g. the maturities it is provided at), but also, for example, in 
the management of the risks associated with the collateral that the institutions provide for the 
Eurosystem liquidity loans and in terms of the fi nancial market distortions that may arise if 
collateral requirements lead banks to demand some types of assets more than others, be-
cause the latter are not accepted by the central bank in its monetary policy operations. How-
ever, the extent of these challenges will depend crucially on the duration and scope of this 
greater demand.
Against this background, this article analyses the role that the standing facilities provided for in 
the Eurosystem’s operational framework (the marginal lending facility and the deposit facility) 
could play in regulating institutions’ demand for reserves. The analysis is performed in three 
stages. First, the role of standing facilities within the context of the operational framework for 
the implementation of monetary policy and liquidity management is briefl y described. Then, 
the main changes made to this framework in response to the crisis are highlighted. Finally, a 
theoretical framework is constructed in which a change in the interest rates on the standing 
facilities to make an asymmetric corridor around the policy rate may reduce the demand for 
reserves.1
The operational framework of monetary policy in the euro area consists of all the instruments 
and procedures that the Eurosystem has at its disposal to achieve price stability. A basic ele-
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ment of these arrangements is the control of short-term interest rates. There are numerous 
references describing both the tools to control interest rates [see ECB (2008) for a general 
description of the operational framework] and their eventual repercussions on prices and real 
activity [see, for example, the papers on the Monetary Transmission Network, summarised in 
ECB (2002), Angeloni et al. (2003) and ECB (2010)].
The mechanisms for controlling interest rates include standing facilities: the marginal lending 
facility and the deposit facility. Banks with excess reserves can deposit their excess reserves 
and obtain a return, which is set by the monetary authorities, normally at below market rates 
and below the policy interest rate. The interest rate on this facility currently stands 75 basis 
points below the interest rate on main refi nancing operations. Likewise, banks that require 
reserves can have recourse to the marginal lending facility and obtain fi nancing by paying an 
interest rate above the market rate and the policy rate (currently 75 bp above the interest rate 
on main refi nancing operations).
Obviously, the Eurosystem could have complete control over short-term market interest 
rates by reducing the width of the corridor formed by the interest rates on its standing 
facilities to zero: no bank would pay a higher rate in the market than that on the lending 
facility, nor would any bank be prepared to lend its surplus cash at a lower rate than that 
on the deposit facility). But the operational framework of the Eurosystem is designed with 
a “market” orientation, insofar as the interbank market itself determines the level of short-
term interest rates, the task of the central bank being to provide liquidity to ensure that the 
interbank interest rate is sufficiently close to the interest rate on the main refinancing op-
erations.
Given that the return obtained on the deposit facility is lower than that obtained from interbank 
market lending, even with collateral, it is costly for banks to build up reserves in deposit facili-
ties. Accordingly, the use of these facilities is an indication of the degree of confi dence of the 
latter in money markets as a source of liquidity. Before August 2007, the limited use of stand-
ing facilities showed that credit institutions could fi nd liquidity much more easily in the inter-
bank market and were also easily able to fi nd counterparties for any cash surpluses. Moreover, 
most transactions were carried out at the end of the maintenance period when the bank knew 
its liquidity requirements quite accurately and, although the law of one price did not strictly 
hold – among other reasons, because each bank normally had various counterparties [see 
Gaspar, Pérez Quirós and Rodríguez Mendizábal (2008)] – the rate differentials between one 
bank and another and between the types of transactions without collateral and those on the 
collateralised market (repos) were small. The problems of excess demand or supply that arose 
at times were associated with technicalities in the functioning of the market, not with funda-
mental failures of confi dence on the part of the banks in their ability to satisfy their liquidity re-
quirements in the markets.
From August 2007, the progressive loss of confi dence among fi nancial intermediaries reduced 
the ability of the interbank market to redistribute the liquidity injected by the Eurosystem to 
practically zero. The difference between the interest rates on uncollateralised and collateralised 
operations rose to completely unprecedented levels (see Chart 1) refl ecting the reluctance of 
banks to lend to each other in the absence of security. In the face of a crisis of confi dence of 
this magnitude, the market fragmented very easily and rapidly.
The Eurosystem responded to this situation by making some important changes to its arsenal 
of monetary policy and liquidity management instruments. On 8 October 2008, in addition to 
lowering the interest rates on the main refi nancing operations, the ESCB reduced the width of 
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the corridor between the lending and deposit facility rates from 200 to 100 bp2 and decided 
that the main refi nancing operations would be at a fi xed rate and with full allotment.
As a result of these changes the Eurosystem not only assumed the role of liquidity provider of 
last resort, but also the role of redistributing liquidity, which was previously performed by the 
market. Banks needing liquidity began to make heavy use of main refi nancing operations in 
order to secure their reserves, while those with a long position in liquid funds resorted to the 
deposit facility in order to obtain a return on such reserves. As can be seen in Chart 2, at the 
end of September 2008 the use of the deposit facility as a percentage of reserve requirements 
had increased from levels of close to zero to fl uctuate at around 100%, with highs of over 
180%.
Having briefl y reviewed both the role of standing facilities and the strains in the money markets 
since the start of the crisis, this section outlines a scheme that reproduces the fundamental 
elements of the operational framework of monetary policy to enable the role performed by the 
interest rates on standing facilities in credit institutions’ demand for reserves to be analysed.
This scheme consists of a set of credit institutions and a central bank with three instru-
ments. The fi rst instrument is a reserve requirement: the amount of reserves held by the 
credit institutions in their current accounts at the central bank cannot be negative at the end 
of the day and, over a specifi c period (known as the “maintenance period”), their cumulative 
amount cannot fall below a certain amount determined beforehand. The second instrument 
is the main refi nancing operations (MROs), by means of which the central bank injects re-
serves into the system. In this scheme, the MROs are conducted at a fi xed rate and with full 
allotment (i.e. all the reserves that the banks demand are supplied, at a single fi xed interest 
rate determined by the central bank). To simplify the analysis, without any effect on the re-
sults, it can be assumed that there is only one main refi nancing operation, which is con-
ducted at the beginning of the maintenance period and matures at the end of the period. 
Likewise, the overall behaviour of the credit institutions can be assumed to reproduce that 
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2. This decision was revoked on 15 January 2009, when the Governing Council decided to return to a 200 bp corridor. 
For further details on these and other measures introduced in response to the crisis, see Millaruelo (2009). 
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of a single representative bank. Finally, the third instrument of the monetary authority con-
sists of standing facilities. More specifi cally, there is a marginal lending facility under which 
the representative bank can apply to borrow reserves at a lower interest rate than the one 
on main refi nancing operations. There is also a deposit facility, under which the same bank 
can deposit reserves at a higher interest rate than the one on MROs. Since the start of Stage 
Three of EMU, the interest rate on MROs has always been in the middle of the corridor de-
fi ned by the interest rates on the standing facilities. However, as will be seen below, the 
demand for reserves depends not only on the width of the corridor, but also on whether or 
not the corridor is symmetric with respect to the rate on MROs.
To explain the behaviour of the demand for reserves, in the presence of a reserve requirement, 
two shocks that affect the liquidity needs of the representative bank are considered. The fi rst one 
is associated with normal banking business and results in increases or decreases in the balance 
sheet.3 When the number of banks is suffi ciently large, the law of large numbers guarantees that 
this shock will not have effects at the aggregate level and is limited to adding idiosyncratic risk to 
each bank. The second source of uncertainty is designed to capture the effect of the crisis of 
confi dence after the summer of 2007, representing each bank’s subjective perception of the 
possibility of encountering diffi cult market liquidity conditions. More specifi cally, it is assumed 
that the banks assign a certain probability to the existence of a certain amount of aggregate 
exogenous liquidity withdrawal. Both shocks arise after the MRO has been conducted.
In these circumstances, the problem the representative bank of this simplifi ed economy faces 
is what amount of reserves to demand from the central bank in each MRO in order to comply 
with the reserve requirement and to protect itself against liquidity shocks at the lowest possible 
cost. Generally, the bank will demand reserves until the marginal cost of such reserves is equal 
to their marginal expected value. Since we assume open market operations with full allotment 
at a fi xed interest rate, the marginal cost is equal to the central bank’s key policy rate.
As regards the marginal expected value that the bank assigns to the reserves, it is important 
to observe that it must combine two possible results: that the amount of liquidity obtained in 
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3. This shock is modelled as a random variable independently distributed among banks as a normal variable with mean 
0 and a strictly positive standard deviation.
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the MRO enables it to comply precisely with the reserve requirement at the end of the mainte-
nance period or that this amount is lower (higher) than required, in which case it will have to 
resort to the marginal lending (deposit) facility and pay (or receive) the related interest rate. 
Thus, the value of a unit of additional reserves (opportunity cost) is equal to the interest rate on 
the marginal lending facility when it does not satisfy the reserve requirement. By contrast, the 
value of a marginal unit of reserves is equal to the interest rate on the deposit facility when the 
bank has excess reserves at the end of the maintenance period.
Ex ante, at the time of bidding in the main refi nancing operation, banks do not know whether 
they will comply with the reserve requirement at the end of the maintenance period. The mar-
ginal expected value will then be equal to the interest rate on the marginal lending facility 
multiplied by the probability of not satisfying the reserve requirement at the end of the mainte-
nance period plus the interest rate on the deposit facility multiplied by the probability (consist-
ent with the previous one) of having excess reserves at the end of the maintenance period.
At this point, it is important to stress that the marginal expected value of the reserves decreas-
es as the amount of reserves demanded in the MRO rises. The larger the amount of reserves 
the bank has, the greater the probability of having excess reserves at the end of the period and 
the greater the weight of the deposit facility interest rate, which is lower than that on the MRO. 
In particular, the marginal expected value will be close to the interest rate on the marginal lend-
ing facility when the demand for reserves is close to zero and will decrease to the rate of interest 
on the deposit facility when such demand is high. Given that the rate of interest on the MRO is 
inside the corridor defi ned by the rates of interest on the standing facilities, there is a level of 
demand for reserves which equates their marginal cost with their marginal expected value.
Using this analytical scheme it is easy to generate the type of behaviour observed in the cur-
rent fi nancial crisis, i.e. autonomous increases in the demand for reserves in the MRO, which 
are deposited in the deposit facility. Starting from an initial equilibrium situation (marginal ex-
pected value equal to the MRO rate), if an increase occurs in the probability of an aggregate 
withdrawal of reserves, the probability of having to access the marginal lending facility at the 
end of the maintenance period increases and, thus, so does the marginal expected value of 
reserves. If the MRO interest rate does not change, the banks bring the marginal cost of re-
serves back into line with their marginal expected value by increasing their demand for re-
serves in the MRO. These reserves are deposited in the deposit facility and remain there until 
the shock (which results in an aggregate withdrawal of liquidity) occurs.
One way of reducing this excess demand for reserves would be to set the interest rates on the 
standing facilities in such a way that they form an asymmetric corridor around the MRO inter-
est rate. Following the above reasoning, when the probability of an aggregate withdrawal in-
creases, the marginal expected value of the reserves can be reduced by lowering the interest 
rate on standing facilities, while keeping the MRO interest rate unchanged.4 If the objective is 
to bring the demand for reserves down to the level prior to the change in the banks’ percep-
tion, the asymmetry of the rate corridor can be adjusted in this way. The higher the perceived 
level of risk, the closer the rate on the marginal lending facility must be to the MRO rate.
The present crisis is having clear expansionary effects on the demand for reserves in the Eu-
rosystem’s main refi nancing operations. As long as credit institutions continue to perceive an 
Final comments
4.  Alternatively, the interest rate on the marginal lending facility could be reduced on its own, although this would reduce 
the width of the corridor. In less simplifi ed schemes than the one used here, that may have other effects.
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elevated risk of negative liquidity shocks with effects that could not be covered in the money 
markets, this excess demand will not subside. This poses a number of challenges for the 
monetary authority’s liquidity management policy.
One possible way of regulating an excess demand for reserves without the need to change the 
operational framework of monetary policy is to set the interest rates on standing facilities in 
such a way that they form an asymmetric corridor around the level of the interest rates on the 
main refi nancing operations. As explained in this article, autonomous increases in the demand 
for reserves that are not desired by the Eurosystem may be counteracted by moving the upper 
limit of this corridor closer to the policy interest rate (and reducing the lower limit by the same 
amount, if it is desired to keep the width of the corridor unchanged). Intuitively, an asymmetric 
corridor of this type makes it relatively cheaper to use the marginal lending facility at the same 
time as it penalises the use of the deposit facility. In this way, the excessive demand for re-
serves is discouraged, reducing the risk of an undesired accumulation of reserves.
This instrument could enable the monetary policy stance to be more clearly separated from 
liquidity management and may also be adjusted continually to any change in market condi-
tions. For example, in the present circumstances, in which the exceptional liquidity providing 
measures introduced during the crisis are gradually being withdrawn, it may be useful to limit 
during the transition the extent of possible episodes of excessive reserve accumulation and 
their possible undesired effects on short-term market rates, although it should be pointed out 
that this transition raises a broader set of challenges, which may have different implications 
from those considered here. The analysis of these challenges goes well beyond the scope of 
the objectives of this article.
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